The objective of this paper is two-fold: to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in Bertrand supergames with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and, from a more applied perspective, to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy, taking into account dynamic aspects of competition. It is well-known that capacity constraints a¤ect tacit collusion, as they limit both incentives to deviate (e.g., to undercut rivals) and retaliation possibilities. However, most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations, where all …rms have the same capacity, which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results but also considerably limits the scope of application. Studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyze the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities (expansions, but also mergers, split-o¤s, transfers, ...) and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy. These guidelines, which di¤er substantially from those inspired by more static analyses, such as the Her…ndahl or other standard concentration tests, are applied to a famous merger that took place in the French bottled water market, the Nestlé-Perrier merger case.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyse tacit collusion with (asymmetric) capacity constraints and, from a more applied perspective, to shed more light on merger analysis, taking into account dynamic aspects of competition.
Capacity constraints play a key role in the analysis of tacit collusion. Firms can indeed maintain collusive prices if they believe that undercutting their rivals would trigger a price war and thus harm future pro…ts: The potential short-term gain from a deviation is then outweighed by the long-run losses from the price war. Capacity constraints a¤ect this basic insight in two ways, as they reduce both the incentives to deviate and the severity of price wars. Most studies on this issue have so far focused on symmetric situations, where all …rms have the same capacity, 1 which limits their scope of application. For example, while this framework allows to study the impact of a uniform change in all …rms' capacities or of a demand shock, it does not allow the analysis of individual changes in capacity. Similarly, comparative statics with respect to number of (symmetric) …rms, 2 hardly provide helpful guidelines when evaluating the impact of a merger. In both cases, studying collusion with asymmetric capacities is a prerequisite for a relevant analysis.
Analysing tacit collusion with asymmetric capacity constraints is unfortunately quite di¢cult. Lambson (1994) , who o¤ers one of the most advanced analyses in that direction, still only provides partial characterizations. 3 A few studies, however, suggest that asymmetry in …rms' capacities hurt tacit collusion. Mason, Phillips and Nowell (1992) note that in experimental duopoly games, cooperation is more likely when players face symmetric production costs. 4 Lambson (1996) shows that, in a symmetric Bertrand supergame where …rms are capacityconstrained, introducing a slight asymmetry in the capacities hurts tacit collusion; and Davidson and Deneckere (1990) and Pénard (1997) show that asymmetric capacities make collusion more di¢cult in duopolies. 5 We explore this issue in further detail, and show that the introduction of asymmetric capacities indeed hurts collusion when the aggregate capacity is limited, although it may help collusion when the aggregate capacity is much larger than the market size.
We also address a distinct issue, which is the impact of changes in the dis- 1 See e.g. Abreu (1986) for an analysis of symmetric Cournot supergames, Brock and Scheinkman (1985) for a …rst analysis of symmetric Bertrand supergames, extended by Lambson (1987) . 2 For examble, Brock and Scheinkman (1985) show, in a model with linear demand and variable costs, that the highest sustainable per capita pro…t varies non-monotonically with the number of …rms (assuming that all …rms, including new ones, have the same per capita capacity). 3 Lambson shows for example that the optimal punishment schemes ("penal codes") are such that the …rm with the largest capacity gets no more that its minmax pro…t, but smaller …rms get more (except if …rms are very patient) than their respective minmax pro…ts. He also gives an upper bound on the punishments that can be in ‡icted on small …rms using a particular class of penal codes (proportional to capacities). 4 Relatedly, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that, in the absence of capacity constraints, tacit collusion is easier when …rms have symmetric costs and market shares 5 Davidson and Deneckere study the use of grim-trigger strategies in a Bertrand setting, while Pénard relies on minmax punishments in a linear Cournot setting. Both papers also address capacity investment decisions, whereas we focus on the allocation of existing capacities. tribution of capacities (mergers, split-o¤s, transfers, ...). 6 For that purpose, in a model of repeated Bertrand competition, we ask the following question: Given the distribution of capacities, for which values of the discount factor can …rms sustain tacit collusion? As usual, collusion is sustainable when the discount factor is higher than a threshold, and we then analyse the impact of changes in capacities on this minimal threshold. This analysis provides guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy, which di¤er from the guidelines inspired by static analyses, such as the reference to Her…ndahl or other standard concentration tests. The analysis also casts some doubts on standard "remedies" routinely used by competition authorities, such as transferring some assets of the merged …rm to existing competitors. Finally, we apply those guidelines to the Nestlé-Perrier merger case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 o¤ers a complete characterization of a particular class of collusive equilibria, where …rms keep constant -possibly asymmetric-market shares. 7 Section 4 discusses the impact of asymmetry in the distribution (both for this particular class of equilibria and for the most general one) as well as of various changes in the distribution of capacities (mergers, split-o¤s, transfers). Section 5 applies the analysis to the Nestlé-Perrier merger case. Except when otherwise mentioned, proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
We consider a model of Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition with capacity constraints between n …rms. The demand side consists of a mass M of in…nitesimal buyers, each willing to buy one unit as long as the price does not exceed 1. Each …rm i has a constant unit cost, normalized to 0, and a limited capacity k i > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume k 1 ::: k n , and denote by k´(k 1 ; :::; k n ) the distribution of capacities, by K´P i k i the total capacity and by K ¡i´Pj6 =i k j the overall capacity of …rm i's rivals. For a given distribution of capacities, …rm i's relevant capacity isk i´m infk i ; M g: if a …rm can serve the entire market, it does not matter whether it can serve it two or three times; lastly,
The monopoly price is p m = 1. Throughout the paper we refer to a competi- 6 Fershtman and Pakes (1999) further explore the interaction between collusion and the industry structure, allowing for entry and exit as well as asymmetric sizes but restricting attention to a particular class of pricing policies. 7 As we will see, these collusive equilibria are at least as powerful as standard trigger-type equilibria (where deviations are punished by a reversal to the static Nash equilibrium) or equilibria with the optimal proportional penal codes analyzed by Lambson (1994) .
tive stage game, where …rms simultaneously set their prices, which are perfectly observed by all buyers and …rms; then, buyers go to the …rm with the lowest price and decide whether or not to buy; if they are rationed they go to the next lowest priced …rm, and so forth, as long as the price o¤ered does not exceed their reservation price. 8 If several …rms charge the same price, consumers divide as they wish between those …rms. We denote by ¼ i the pro…t obtained by …rm i. We assume that competition is e¤ective, i.e., in any Nash equilibrium aggregate pro…ts are strictly lower than the monopoly pro…t, ¦ m ; this is the case if and only if the aggregate capacity of the …rms is strictly larger than the market size (K > M ), 9 in which case ¦ m = M . Lastly, we denote by
To analyse tacit collusion, we consider the in…nite repetition of this competition game, where all …rms use the same discount factor ± 2 (0; 1) and maximize the expected sum of their discounted pro…ts
To de…ne collusion, we will refer to the (per period) value of an equilibrium, de…ned as the (normalized) expected sum of discounted pro…ts that …rms obtain along the equilibrium path:
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A collusive equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated game whose value is strictly higher than the expected aggregate pro…t generated by any Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and we will say that collusion is sustainable when there exists a collusive equilibrium. We will also say that perfect collusion is sustainable if there exists an equilibrium with a value equal to the monopoly pro…t ¦ m . Our goal is to characterize, for any distribution of capacities k, the lowest discount factor ±(k) for which (perfect) collusion is sustainable.
Characterizing the set of collusive equilibria is a di¢cult task, mainly because the maximal sustainable punishments also depend on the capacity distribution. One simple case is when small …rms are not "too small", namely K ¡n¸M . In that case, any subset of (n ¡ 1) …rms can serve the entire market; the static Nash equilibrium yields zero pro…ts and obviously constitutes the optimal punishment. Denoting by ® i the share of the market served by …rm i, 11 collusion can then be 8 Since buyers are identical, we do not need to specify the rationing scheme more precisely. 9 Firms' pro…ts add up to ¦ m = M if and only if …rms charge p m = 1 with probability 1. If this is the case in equilibrium, then each …rm must obtain a pro…t equal to ¼ i = k i , which it can secure by slightly undercutting its rivals; but this cannot be true for all …rms when the total capacity exceeds the market size. Conversely, when the total capacity does not exceed the market size, charging the monopoly price is a dominant strategy for each …rm. 10 The normalizing factor (1 ¡ ±) ensures that the pro…ts of the repeated game are in the same units as the pro…ts of the stage game; dividing by the monopoly pro…ts (¦ m = M) implies that the relevant range is from V = 0 (perfect competition without capacity constraint) to V = 1 (perfect collusion).
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That is, ® i is the volume served by …rm i. If the entire market is served,
sustained if and only, for each …rm i = 1; :::; n:
Hence collusion is sustainable if and only if ±¸1 ¡ max i f® i =k i g. This implies that the market shares that are most favourable to collusion are proportional to the relevant capacities 12 and, for those market shares, collusion is sustainable if and only if:
The sustainability of collusion then only depends on the aggregate relevant capacity, not on its distribution. 13 
®-equilibria
The analysis is more di¢cult when small …rms are indeed "small" (K ¡n < M ). Therefore, we will focus in this section on a particular class of equilibria, where …rms follow the same strategy and maintain constant market shares: for any distribution of market shares ® = (® 1 ; : : : ; ® n ) satisfying 0 ® i k i and P i ® i M , an ®-equilibrium will be such that in any equilibrium path, each …rm i obtains a share ® i of the market market. 14 We provide below a characterization of the lowest discount factor e ±(k; ®) for the existence of a collusive ®-equilibrium, as well as the minimal threshold ± ¤ (k) = min ® e ±(k; ®) for the existence of at least one collusive ®-equilibrium (throughout this section, "equilibrium" will stand for "®-equilibrium"). We will focus on capacities such that K ¡n < M , which impliesk i = k i < M for i < n (for K ¡n¸M , as well as for symmetric capacities, ± ¤ (k) = ± (k) -see Comment 1 below).
Necessary and su¢cient conditions for collusion.
The following Lemma characterizes necessary and su¢cient conditions for collusion: 12 max i f® i = b k i g is smallest when ® i = b k i is the same for all …rms, i.e., ® i =k i M=K.
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A redistribution of capacity may however a¤ect the sustainability of collusion if it modi…es …rms' relevant capacities -see Sections 4 and 5.
14 The restriction applies to equilibrium paths (including those that follow a deviation), not to possible deviations. Also, for simplicity we refer to ® i as …rm i's market share, even though it represents a number of customers rather than a proportion of the market.
Lemma 3.1. Fix ® = (® i ) i=1;:::;n satisfying 0 ® i k i for i = 1; : : : ; n and
If there exists a collusive ®-equilibrium, there exists a per period value V satisfying, for i = 1; :::; n: By construction, in a collusive ®-equilibrium, …rm i's continuation payo¤ is proportional to its constant market share and thus of the form ® i V , for some continuation value V . Condition (P i ) asserts that …rm i's continuation payo¤ cannot be worse than its minmax, while condition (E i ) asserts that the threat of being "punished" by ® i V deters …rm i from deviating from a collusive path. These conditions are clearly necessary, but Lemma 3.1 establishes that, together, they ensure that the value V (and any larger value) can be sustained as an ®-equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 implies that the set of equilibrium values associated with a pro…le of market shares ® is an interval of the form [V (K; ®; ±) ; 1], where V (K; ®; ±) is the smallest value satisfying conditions ((P i ) ; (E i )) i=1;:::;n . In particular, perfect collusion (V = 1) is sustainable whenever some collusion is sustainable; in the following, we will thus focus on the sustainability of perfect collusion.
Collusion for given market shares
Building on Lemma 3:1, we can easily characterize the sustainability of perfect collusion: Proposition 3.2. Fix a distribution of market shares ® = (® i ) i=1;:::;n satisfying 0 ® i k i for i = 1; :::; n and P i ® i = M ; perfect collusion is sustainable as an ®-equilibrium if and only if ±¸e ±(k; ®), where the threshold e ±(k; ®) is characterized by
¡ e V ; (3.1)
Proof. From Lemma (3:1), perfect collusion is sustainable if and only if there exists V satisfying f(E i ) ; (P i )g i=1;:::;n , which can be rewritten as (note that (E i ) implies ® i > 0):
Combining these two inequalities implies
or ±¸e ±(k; ®). Conversely, if ±¸e ±(k; ®), then V = e V (k; ®) satis…es the two sets of inequalities. e V (k; ®) is the lowest V satisfying (P i ). For ±¸e ±(k; ®), it also satis…es (E i ) and the set of ®¡equilibrium values is therefore [ e V (k; ®); 1], 15 so that
can be interpreted as the largest aggregate punishment that can be sustained.
represents …rm i's proportional gain from deviating, and e°(k; ®) is the largest such gain.
Collusion for endogenous market shares
We now characterize the optimal market shares for collusion, which minimize e ±(k; ®) and thus e°(k; ®)=(1 ¡ e V (k; ®)). The denominator in the latter expression is maximal when e V (k; ®) is minimized, which is obtained for market shares that are proportional to minmax pro…ts. But the numerator e°(k; ®) is instead minimal when market shares are proportional to (relevant) capacities. Since minmax pro…ts are not in general proportional to capacities, there is a con ‡ict between decreasing e V (k; ®) (punishment concern) and decreasing e°(k; ®) (deviation concern).
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The following Proposition asserts that the deviation concern is the dominant one and characterizes the minimal threshold for collusion:
That is, V (k; ®; ±) is independent of ± for ±¸e ± (k; ®).
Given K ¡n < M, the only instance where this con ‡ict disappears is when …rms have the same capacity (symmetric con…guration). and:
Proof. The proof builds again on the necessary conditions outlined in Lemma (3:1). Adding-up (P n ) and (E n ) yields:
or:
Similarly, adding-up (P n ) ; (E 1 ) ::: (E n¡1 ) and using V¸M ¡K ¡n ®n yields:
3) and (3:4) yields:
¡ M´decreases with ® n and equalsk n =K for ® n =k n M=K, the right-hand side of (3:5)is at least equal tok n =K. And this lower bound is achieved if and only if ± = ® n = ³k n ¡ ® n´= ³K ¡ M´, i.e., if (3:3) and (3:4), and thus all conditions (E i ) i=1;:::;n , are satis…ed with equality, implying ® = ® ¤ (k). To conclude it su¢ces to check that conditions (P i ) i=1;:::;n¡1 are also satis…ed when ® = ® ¤ (k). They are trivially satis…ed ifK ¡i > M (since …rm i's minmax is then zero). Otherwise, when ® = ® ¤ (k), (P i ) can be written as
Since the right-hand side increases with i, (P i ) follows from (P n ).
The optimal market shares ® ¤ i thus minimize e°(k; ®), the largest proportional gain from deviating, even if this does not maximize the punishment 1 ¡ e V (k; ®). Comment 1: Restriction to ®-equilibria Focussing on ®-collusive equilibria a priori restricts the scope for collusion by limiting the punishments that can be in ‡icted on deviating …rms. The punishments achieved with ®-equilibria are however at least as e¤ective as those generated by reverting to a Nash equilibrium of the competitive stage game, where those pro…ts, ¼ N i , necessarily satisfy:
Thus the threshold ± ¤ (k) is -weakly-lower than for standard trigger-strategy equilibria. 19 Furthermore, a …rm can never be punishmed below its minmax; therefore,
, where ±(k), the threshold for collusion if minmax pro…ts were implementable, is characterized by
where
There are two instances, however, where minmax pro…ts can be implemented through ®-equilibria; this is when: (i) …rms are symmetric (k i = K=n); and (ii) K ¡n¸M , in which case ¼ i (k) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; n.
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Therefore, in both instances
, that is, the restriction to ®-equilibria does not limit the scope for collusion.
Comment 2: Symmetric capacities If k i = K=n > M , there are no e¤ective capacity constraints and a small change in market size or a uniform increase in capacity has no e¤ect on collusion:
If instead k i = K=n < M, each …rm faces a capacity constraint and a decrease in the market size or a uniform increase in capacity increases the gains from deviating, 18 The largest …rm gets at least M ¡ K ¡n > 0 by charging p n = 1 with probability 1 and will thus never charge a price below p = (M ¡ K ¡n )=k n . But then, by charging a price slightly below p any …rm i < n can sell at full capacity and get
In the case of a duopoly (n = 2), the punishment pro…ts used here,
actually coincide with the Nash equilibrium pro…ts. In the case of a triopoly (n = 3), for K ¡3 < M < K Nash equilibrium pro…ts coincide with the punishments used here if
, so that ®¡collusive equilibria are strictly more e¤ective for collusion than trigger strategies based on reversal to Nash. 20 For the symmetric case, it su¢ces to note that the "best" collusive ®-equilibrium (achieved for ® i =k i =K) punishes the largest …rm by its minmax pro…t; this therefore applies to all …rms when they are symmetric. For the latter case (K ¡n¸M ), it su¢ces to note that the collusive equilibrium characterized in the previous section, where all …rms charge zero price after a deviation, can be constructed as an ®-equilibrium (market shares being irrelevant when prices are zero). but may also enhance punishments when K ¡n = (n ¡ 1) K=n < M . We must therefore distinguish two cases (see Figure 1 ): 21 Place Figure 1 here ² If K=n < M < (n ¡ 1) K=n, any (n ¡ 1) …rms can cover the market and punishments are maximal (zero pro…ts); a decrease in the market size or a uniform increase in capacity thus only increases the aggregate gain from deviations, making collusion more di¢cult:
K=n, a decrease in the market size or a uniform increase in capacity also enhances punishment possibilities, by increasing the total (relevant) capacity of any (n ¡ 1) …rms; this favourable e¤ect on punishments exactly o¤sets the adverse e¤ect on gains from deviations:
Comment 3: Market shares For a discount factor ± = ± ¤ (k), collusion may only be supported for market shares equal to ® ¤ (k) and …rms with a larger capacity thus obtain a larger share of the market. As the discount factor increases, the range of market shares for which collusion can be supported increases. To …x ideas, consider for instance the case of a duopoly where M¸k 2 > k 1 > M=2 (that is, the smaller …rm could still potentially get the largest market share). The range of market shares that allow for perfect collusion are of the form f(® 1 ; ® 2 ),
Proposition 3.4.
(
, but as ± increases from ± ¤ (k) to 1, the range expands on both sides. In the limit case ± = 1; ¹ ® i = k i : Either …rm can sell at full capacity, implying that the smaller …rm can have a bigger share than the other one; however, as long as ± < (k 2 ¡ M=2) = (K ¡ M) (< 1), the smaller …rm necessarily gets a smaller share (i.e., ¹ ® 1 (±) < M=2). The …rst case cannot occur in a duopoly situation.
Asymmetric capacities, mergers and collusion
This section draws the implications of the above analysis for merger and competition policy. We focus on ®¡collusive equilibria, which entails a loss of generality since transfers across …rms are constrained and punishments harder to sustain. However, using consistently the same class of equilibria allows us to analyse variations of the threshold in response to changes of capacities. We also explore the analysis of the most general class of collusive equilibria; although we do not provide a full characterization of the threshold ±(k), two partial characterizations con…rm the qualitative insights derived from the analysis of collusive ® -equilibria.
Using Proposition (3:3) and since ± ¤ (k) = ± (k) is given by (2:1) when K ¡nM , the threshold ± ¤ can be written as (withK ¡n´Pi<nki ):
Increase in one …rm's capacity
When small …rms are not too small (K ¡n¸M ), ± ¤ (k) = ± (k) only depends on the aggregate relevant capacity: punishment possibilities are maximal (zero profits) and independent of the distribution of capacity. Capacities thus only a¤ect the incentives to deviate, and any increase in a …rm's relevant capacity harms collusion. When instead small …rms are indeed small (K ¡n < M ), punishment possibilities are limited and the distribution of capacity matters. The proof of Proposition (3:3)shows that the only relevant condition (P i ) is (P n ): that is, the main problem for collusion is to prevent the largest …rm from deviating; collusion is easier when the large …rm's incentive to deviate (its relevant capacityk n ) decreases, and when small …rms' retaliation power (their aggregate capacity K ¡n ) increases (see Figure 3 ).
Place Figure 3 here

Variations in demand
When small …rms are not too small (K ¡n¸M ), a reduction in demand hurts collusion.
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In contrast, when small …rms are really small (K ¡n < M ), a reduction in demand either has no impact on collusion (if k n < M, since the demand 22 Except if k 1¸M , in which case there are no capacity constraints:K = nM and ± ¤ (K) = ± (K) = 1 ¡ 1=n.
reduction then does not a¤ect …rms' relevant capacities:k i = k i for every …rm i), or is bene…cial to collusion (if K ¡n < M < k n , since then the demand reduction still does not a¤ect small …rms' retaliation ability but reduces the large …rm's incentive to deviate:k i = k i for i < n butk n = M ).
Capacity transfers
Capacity transfers a¤ect collusion only if they involve the largest …rm. The following table recalls the e¤ect on ± ¤ of a decrease in k i and of an increase in k n , and presents the overall impact of the transfer k i ! k n from …rm i < n to …rm n:
When small …rms are really small, transferring capacity from a small …rm to the largest one hurts collusion (± ¤ increases): it reduces small …rms' retaliation ability (since k i < M ) and, moreover, exacerbates the large …rm's incentive to deviate if k n < M . In contrast, when small …rms can cover the entire market (K ¡n > M ), only the incentives to deviate matter. A similar transfer then cannot hurt collusion since it cannot increase the aggregate relevant capacity: it is neutral if k i < k n < M (sincek i +k n = k i + k n is not a¤ected by the transfer) and may even make collusion easier if the largest …rm has excess capacity (k i < M < k n ), since in that case it reduces the small …rm's relevant capacity without increasing the large …rm's one (k i = k i butk n = M ).
The next Proposition builds on the above observations and addresses the following question: For a given total capacity K and a given number of …rms n, what are the distributions of capacity that most facilitate collusion ?
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The answer turns out to depend critically on the comparison between the market size M and the maximal capacity of the n ¡ 1 smaller …rms, n ¡ 1 n K:
Proposition 4.1. Best capacity distributions for collusive ®-equilibria.
When the small …rms all have a capacity close to 0, then the largest …rm can secure a pro…t close to the monopoly pro…t in any period. Thus, in that case, whether collusion can be sustained or not is not relevant. Our analysis is relevant when the small …rms' aggregate capacity is not negligible, in which case collusion increases signi…cantly aggregate pro…ts.
For any K and n¸2, the set K ¤ (K; n) of distributions that minimize ± ¤ (k) is given by:
consists of all distributions that allow the n ¡ 1 smallest …rms to cover the entire market (K ¡n¸M ).
² If K > 2M and n¸3, K ¤ (K; n) consists of all the asymmetric distributions that give a total capacity K ¡n = M to n ¡1 small …rms and the entire extra capacity to a large …rm (
Proposition 4.1 is driven by two principles: to facilitate collusion, 1) the retaliation possibilities of the smallest …rms should be maximized, i.e. the aggregate capacity of the smallest …rms should be increased, up to market size if possible; 2) among the distributions of capacities that maximize retaliation possibilities, the gains from deviating should be minimized.
When the total capacity is small ( n ¡ 1 n K M ), the smallest (n ¡ 1) …rms cannot cover the market; in that case, the main problem is to discipline the largest …rm; starting from any asymmetric situation, transferring some capacity from the largest …rm to a small one then both enhances the small …rms' retaliation power and limits the large …rm's incentives to deviate: the best distribution of capacities is therefore the symmetric one, k S . When instead the total capacity is large enough ( n ¡ 1 n K > M ), retaliation possibilities are maximized whenever the small …rms can cover the market (K ¡n¸M ) and the main residual problem is to limit the aggregate incentives to deviate, i.e., to reduce the total relevant capacitŷ K. When K > 2M and n¸3, this is achieved only when K ¡n is precisely equal to market, whereas when K 2M or n = 2, all distributions satisfying K ¡n¸M actually yield the same relevant capacity (K = K when K < 2M andK = 2M in the duopoly case).
While Proposition 4.1 restricts attention to collusive ®-equilibria, the next Proposition shows that the main insights remain valid when considering more general collusive equilibria: Proposition 4.2. Best capacity distributions for general collusive equilibria.
Fix K and n. Then the set K(K; n) of distributions of capacities that minimize ± (k) is such that:
, for any distribution k satisfying:
perfect collusion cannot be sustained: k = 2 K(K; n).
When K > 2M , collusive ®-equilibria allow for maximal punishments (zero pro…ts) and the optimal distributions of capacities are unchanged when considering more general collusive equilibria. When K n n¡1
M , an asymmetry between the capacities of the …rms makes collusion more di¢cult to sustain. The intuition there is that punishing a …rm with a low capacity puts an upper bound on the prices other …rms may charge. Hence the other …rms have to su¤er from the punishment they impose on this particular …rm. But then, a …rm with a large capacity might be reluctant to participate in such a punishment. 24 
The impact of mergers on tacit collusion
We now apply our analysis of collusive ®-equilibria to the study of mergers and break-ups. The conventional wisdom is that divestitures foster competition, whereas mergers raise antitrust concerns. One argument may be that tacit collusion requires …rms to agree on how to support it, and that reaching such a (tacit) agreement may be more di¢cult when the number of …rms is larger (e.g., …rms may …nd it more di¢cult to agree on their respective market shares). Compte and Jehiel (1996) supports this intuition in the context of a non-cooperative bargaining model. We will abstract from such issues here, and focus on the sole impact of the distribution of capacities on collusive (®-)equilibria.
Our analysis emphasizes two distinct elements involved in mergers and breakups. On the one hand, a merger reduces the number of competitors, which tends to facilitate collusion: This well-known e¤ect dominates when capacity constraints are not too severe. On the other hand, a merger exacerbates the asymmetry in capacities when it involves the largest …rm. This tends to hurt tacit collusion, and this e¤ect dominates when the capacity constraints are more severe or their distribution is very asymmetric. 25 24 Kühn and Motta (19??) obtain a similar insight in a context where …rms di¤er in the range of varieties they o¤er. There again, and for a very similar reason, an asymmetry in the distribution of varieties among the …rms makes collusion more di¢cult to sustain.
In the absence of any capacity constraint (k i¸M , and thusk i = M , for each …rm i), collusion can be sustained as long as ±¸1 ¡ M=K = 1 ¡ 1=n. The standard result then applies: any merger facilitates collusion because it reduces the number of competitors, whereas any break-up of a …rm makes collusion more di¢cult to sustain, since the aggregate relevant capacity necessarily increases. 26 The same argument carries over to situations where …rms are capacity-constrained but not too much so (K ¡n¸M ). In that case, the maximal punishment (zero pro…ts) can still be imposed on any …rm, and only the incentives to deviate matter, summarized by the total relevant capacityK; perfect collusion can be sustained as long as ±¸1 ¡ M=K (butK=M may now be lower than n). Since a merger can only decrease the total relevant capacity, it can only facilitate collusion: More precisely, any merger leading to the creation of a …rm "large enough" to cover the entire market facilitates collusion, while the other mergers have no impact on collusion. Conversely, forcing any such large …rm to divest part of its capacity always makes collusion more di¢cult to sustain (provided that the divested capacity is not given to a …rm already large enough to cover the market), while the break-up of a small …rm that cannot initially cover the entire market has no impact on collusion.
In contrast, when capacity constraints are more severe (K ¡n < M ), any merger involving the largest …rm hurts tacit collusion. The reason is that, as already emphasized, the key issue for tacit collusion is then to prevent this large …rm from deviating: but such a merger precisely reduces small …rms' ability to retaliate (by transferring some of their capacity to the largest …rm), and may moreover exacerbate the large …rm's gains from deviation if it was initially capacity-constrained. In contrast, forcing the large …rm to divest part of its capacity k n might facilitate collusion.
Policy implications. This analysis suggests merger guidelines that substantially di¤er from those inspired by static analyses. In particular, for a given number of …rms, the Her…ndahl or other standard concentration tests tend to predict that a more symmetric con…guration is more likely to be competitive (the Her…ndahl index is minimal for a symmetric con…guration). Similarly, the static Nash equilibrium industry-wide pro…ts often decrease with symmetry. 27 The above analysis instead suggests that asymmetry may be pro-competitive, as it may hurt tacit collusion. A su¢ciently asymmetric con…guration may even more than compen- 26 If for example …rm i is broken-up into two …rms i and i 0 with capacities k 0 i and k
Suppose for example that a capacity K is distributed among n …rms who play the static price competition game described above. Each …rm i gets max © 0; M ¡ sate for a reduction in the number of …rms: If K ¡n < M , any merger involving the large …rm hurts collusion and may thus bene…t competition since, although it reduces the number of competitors, it exacerbates the asymmetry between them (the Her…ndahl test would in contrast advise that the pre-merger situation is more favourable to competition). The above analysis also casts some doubt on standard merger remedies, which consist in divesting some of the capacity of the merged …rm and transferring it to other competitors: Such remedy, which tends to maintain a reasonable amount of symmetry between the competitors, avoids the creation of a "dominant position" but may help tacit collusion. The above analysis thus suggests that merger policy should treat very di¤erently "single dominance" cases and "collective dominance" cases. The following discussion of the Nestlé-Perrier case illustrates these issues.
An analysis of the Nestlé-Perrier merger
On February 25 1992 Nestlé, which manufactures and sells food products and is active in the French bottled water sector with two major brands (Vittel and Hepar) noti…ed to the EEC commission a public bid for 100% of the shares of source Perrier SA which is mainly active in the manufacture and distribution of bottled waters. The Commission decision 
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In the rest of our analysis we will ignore the smaller producers.
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According to the EU merger regulation a concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which e¤ective competition would be signi…-cantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it is incompatible with the common market. There is little doubt, when one considers the case law and the importance that the Commission attaches to the distribution of market For con…dentiality reasons, the decision does not indicate individual market shares and production capacities. However, these shares and capacities can be roughly estimated for each of the main suppliers, using information provided in di¤erent recitals of the decision -see Compte-Jenny-Rey (1997). Due to space constraints the method used is not detailed here and only the results are mentioned.
Indeed in recital 129 of its decision the Commission notes: "Local spring and mineral waters are too small and dispersed to constitute a signi…cant alternative to the national waters. As examined (above), none of these companies constitutes a su¢cient price-constraining competitive force (...).". shares in merger cases, that the parties to the merger thought that the Commission was likely to oppose the takeover of Perrier by Nestlé on the ground that it created a dominant position for the merging parties. 31 However, Nestlé and Perrier had also agreed, subject to Nestlé acquiring control of Perrier, to transfer Volvic (a major still mineral source of Perrier) to BSN. With this transfer taken into consideration the post merger situation would have been a balanced duopoly 32 and the merging parties may have hoped to avoid the risk of having the Commission block the takeover since after the merger neither one of the two remaining major operators could be considered to hold a dominant position.
However, the Commission which for a while had sought to expand the scope of the EU merger regulation used this takeover as a test case to put forth a new interpretation of the merger regulation. It claimed that the regulation should be construed not only as prohibiting mergers which create or strengthen a dominant position for the merging …rms but also as prohibiting mergers which create or strengthen an "oligopolistic dominance". For the Commission such a creation or strengthening would occur if "there is already before the merger weakened competition between the oligopolists which is likely to be further weakened by a signi…cant increase in concentration and if there is no su¢cient price constraining competition from actual or potential competition coming from outside the oligopoly".
The Commission then reasoned that competition had been weak on the bottled water market even before the merger. It based its conclusion on three main facts "the high degree of market parallelism over a long period of time, the very high production-cost margin, and the large gap between ex-works price of national mineral waters and local spring waters". It further stated that "the reduction from three to only two national suppliers would make anticompetitive parallel 31 In recitals 132-134, the Commission stated that such a merger would have led the merging …rms to have approximately 53% ( by volume) of the bottled water market, more than twice the market share of the next biggest competitor. It added that the merged entity would have had capacities exceeding the volume of the total bottled water market, would have had a major advantage over its main competitor in terms of the number of major sources held both on the still and on the sparkling mineral water segments and would not have been constrained either by local spring water sources, by retailers or wholesalers or by potential competition. It concluded that "the reduction from three to two suppliers (duopoly) is not a mere cosmetic change in the market structure. The concentration would lead to the elimination of a major operator who has the biggest capacity reserves and sales volumes in the market." 32 Cf. recital 123: " After the merger , there would remain two national suppliers on the market which would have similar capacities and similar market shares ( symmetric dupoly)". Indeed the sales of Nestlé+Perrier-Volvic, on the one hand, and of BSN + Volvic, on the other hand, would have been roughly equal to 2 billion liters each and each would have had a market share of 38%.
behaviour leading to collective abuses much easier". This last assessment was based on two main types of considerations, namely:
-the two players remaining in the market would be similar in size and nature and neither one would enjoy a signi…cant cost advantage over the other; technology was mature and R&D played no major role; -the major mineral water suppliers had developed instruments allowing the controlling and the monitoring of each other's behaviour; furthermore demand for mineral water was relatively price inelastic, fringe …rms or retailers did not constitute an e¤ective competitive constraint and barriers to entry were high; thus a tacit coordination of pricing policies between BSN and Nestlé would be easily achieved;
Thus, in its decision, the Commission explicitly ruled out allowing the takeover with the transfer of Volvic to BSN (to avoid the strengthening of an oligopolistic dominance) or allowing the merger without the transfer of Volvic to BSN (to avoid single …rm dominance for the merged entity). It thus was faced with two choices, either blocking the merger altogether or allowing it subject to divestiture. During the proceedings, Nestlé, aware of the fact that the Commission was likely to oppose the merger on the basis of the fact that it was incompatible with the Common Market, agreed to meet the requirements of the Commission by committing itself to selling various well known brands (among them Vichy, Thonon, Pierval, Saint Yorre) and three billion litres of water capacity to a third party so that this third party could become an active player on the market. Subject to the compliance with this commitment, the Commission did not oppose the takeover of Perrier by Nestlé and the subsequent transfer of Volvic to BSN.
This decision raises several questions in relation with our previous discussion of the impact of mergers on tacit collusion. Contrary to what our analysis suggested, the Commission spent relatively little time discussing the consequences of the distribution of capacity obtained through the various solutions on the possibility of collusion among the …rms. Similarly, the Commission did not compare the situation created by the commitment it imposed to accept the merger with the pre merger situation. Yet if both situations entail the same number of major actors ( three in both cases) they seem to be characterized by di¤erent distributions of capacities.
Drawing from the indications given in the decision and our own estimates, it seems that the distribution of capacity before and after the merger were the following (sales and capacities are in million litres, whereas k i =M is the ratio of capacity over market size): Using the estimated …gures of capacity in relation to the total market size in the di¤erent solutions, we can now compute the minimum (common) discount factor which would allow a collusive equilibrium in each case: 1) The proposed takeover of Perrier by Nestlé with the resale of Volvic to BSN maximises the scope for collusion: the minimum discount factor for a collusive equilibrium is lower than for any other con…guration, including the pre-merger situation.
2) The situation that minimises the scope for collusion is the solution in which Nestlé and Perrier merge but do not transfer Volvic to BSN: with this transfer, the minimum discount factor jumps from :50 to :75. This …nding is at odds with the Commission decision which states (recital 134): "It cannot be expected that BSN would e¤ectively compete against Nestlé/Perrier since both suppliers would have a strong common interest and incentive to jointly maximize pro…ts". The Commission did not apparently take into consideration that the merged …rms (Perrier and Nestlé) would then be able to compete with BSN without fear of large scale retaliation because of the capacity constraint faced by BSN.
The fact that the merger (without the resale of Volvic to BSN) would make a collusive equilibrium more di¢cult to sustain might also explain why the merging …rms planned to resell Volvic to BSN. The (advertised) desire of the merging …rms to avoid the creation of a dominant position may have been consistent with their (unadvertised) desire to facilitate collusion. 33 These results hold even if the total market for bottled water is de…ned as the sum of the output of the three producers (i.e. 3990 million litres) rather than the sum of the output of the three producers plus the output of the small producers (i.e. 5250 million litres) -see Compte-Jenny-Rey (1997).
3) The third conclusion is that the solution chosen by the Commission (i.e., allowing the merger with the resale of Volvic to BSN and additional commitments to spin o¤ capacities equal to 3000 million litres to an independent operator) is intermediate, from the point of view of the sustainability of a collusive solution, between the proposed merger (which maximises the scope for collusion) and the acceptance of the merger without the resale of Volvic (which minimises this scope). Even though in the latter case there would have been only two main …rms, they would have had a more di¢cult time sustaining collusion than the three …rms (Nestlé, BSN and the new player created by the Commission) will have. The basic reason for this is, …rst, that in the solution preferred by the Commission neither one of the two largest …rms can depart from the collusive equilibrium without exposing itself to retaliation from the other. Since each one of them has a considerable capacity compared with the size of the market, neither one of them can take the risk of retaliation lightly. Second, the new entrant has limited capacities compared to the other two …rms and compared to the market and therefore cannot expect to gain by threatening to force competition on them. Altogether, in this solution, the incentives to depart from the collusive solution are not strong.
One of the questions raised by the decision is why did the Commission allow a solution which appears less attractive from the point of view of competition than allowing the merger to proceed without the transfer of Volvic to BSN.
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There are two possible answers to this question. The …rst possible answer is that the Commission recognized that the transfer of Volvic to BSN was likely to facilitate a collusive solution but also realized that if it prevented such a transfer, Nestlé might challenge the decision (by taking its case to the European Court of Justice) on the basis that the merger regulation did not apply to the creation or strengthening of oligopolistic dominance. Because the Commission did not want to face such a challenge, it may have deliberately promoted a solution which was less favourable from point of view competition than what could be achieved but satis…ed Nestlé su¢ciently so that it would not pursue the matter. Indeed neither Nestlé, although it voiced strong objections against the extensive interpretation of the merger regulation used by the Commission, nor BSN, for obvious reasons, challenged the decision. The second possible answer is that the Commission did not take into account the impact of the distribution of production capacity on the sustainability of collusion and focused instead solely on the number of major players. 
Figure 2
Range of market shares allowing collusion
Figure 3 Critical level for the discount factor for asymmetric …rmŝ k n : relevant capacity of the largest …rm, K ¡n : relevant capacity of the smaller ones.
If V = 0, conditions (P i ) imply that ¼ i = 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n. In that case, p i = 0 is a Nash equilibrium of the static game, which in turn implies that V = 0 is sustainable.
If V > 0, we construct the following punishment path (p t denotes the price charged in the t th period of the punishment): p t = 0 for t = 1; :::; T; p t = p for t = T + 1; p t = 1 for t = T + 2; :::; where T¸0 and p 2 [0; 1] are chosen so that V´± T ((1 ¡ ±)p + ±). Such T and p always exist since V 1. Assuming that deviations from this punishment path are themselves "punished" by returning to the beginning of the punishment path, we now show that no such deviations are pro…table. As usual, it su¢ces to consider one-period deviations and, moreover, since conditions (E i ) rule out deviations in the periods t > T + 1, we may restrict our attention to the …rst T + 1 periods of the punishment path.
At the start of period t T of the punishment path, …rm i's continuation value is ± ¡(t¡1) ® i V . By deviating in one of the …rst T periods, …rm i cannot get more than ¼ i in the current period. Hence such deviations are deterred if:
The most restrictive of these conditions is obtained for t = 1 and coincides with (P i ).
In the (T + 1) th period of punishment, the best deviation consists in either charging the monopoly price (if p is low) or in undercutting the rivals (if p is high, namely, if ® i p >k i ). In the former case, the no-deviation condition is given by (??) with t = T + 1 and is thus implied, too, by (P i ). In the latter case, the no-deviation condition is:
is most restrictive for p = 1, in which case it is equivalent to (E i ). Hence, under conditions (P i ) and (E i ), the continuation value V is sustainable.
For any other value V 0 2 [V; 1], we can construct a price path similar to the one de…ned above, with T¸0 and p 2 [0; 1] now chosen so that V 0´±T ((1 ¡ ±)p + ±), and use the continuation value V to punish any deviation from this path. The left-hand side of (??) becomes
, and is a fortiori satis…ed. The rest of the argument is unchanged and shows that V proof, it su¢ces to check that conditions f(E i ) ; (P i )g i=1;:::;n are always relaxed by an increase in the market shares ®. This is obvious for condition (P i ), and is also true for condition (E i ) since ±V V < 1.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3:4
Fix ±¸± ¤ (k). ® 1 is the value of the following program:
First, at least two of the four constraints must be binding: if only one of them was binding, it would be possible to slightly decrease ® 1 and adapt V so as to keep satisfying this condition and improve on the objective. Second, (E 2 ) cannot be binding:
, which implies k 1 =® 1¸k2 =® 2 , and thus, since (E i ) can be rewritten as
Suppose that (P 2 ) is not binding. Given the two above remarks, the solution is then given by (P 1 ) and (E 1 ) written with equality, that is:
But then (P 2 ) is equivalent to:
is not binding the solution is given by (P 2 ) and (E 1 ) written with equality, that is:
is then equivalent to:
or ± b ±. Hence, ® 1 is given by (??) for ± b ± and by (??) for ±¸b ±. The analysis is similar for ® 1 = M ¡ ® 2 ; reversing the indexes 1 and 2: ® 2 is equal to
however, the critical threshold b ± 0 is always lower than ± ¤ (k), so that only the case ±¸b ± 0 is relevant, and ® 1 is always given by
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4:1
Since this modi…cation only a¤ects the capacities of the small …rms,
n for i < n, and thus a small capacity transfer from the largest …rm to a small one would decrease ± ¤ (k 0 ) (see Table 1 ). The best capacities thus satisfy K ¡n¸M , and the threshold ± ¤ thus only depends onK, which must be minimized. When K 2M or n = 2, the total relevant capacityK is the same for any distribution of capacities k satisfying K ¡n¸M : when K 2M , k n = K ¡ K ¡n < M , hence k i = K i andK = K; when n = 2,k 1 = M =k 2 , hence ± ¤ (k) = 1=2. Assume now K > 2M and n > 2. For any distribution of capacities k satisfying K ¡n = M and k n = K ¡ K ¡n > M , K ¡n = k n = M , henceK = 2M, whereaŝ K 0 > 2M for any distribution k n¡1 n K M implies K ¡n M ; hence ± ¤ (k) =k n =K, which is equal to 1=n for the symmetric distribution k S and strictly higher for any asymmetric distribution.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4:2
Assume that perfect collusion can be sustained. Let v i denote …rm i's equilibrium pro…t. By de…nition of a perfect collusive equilibrium, all …rms charge the monopoly price on the equilibrium path, and we must have:
Providing …rm i the incentives to charge the monopoly price requires:
since the harshest punishment that can be imposed on …rm i in equilibrium cannot be worse than its minmax ¼ i . Adding the inequalities (??) gives a lower bound on ±(k): .10) i) Assume K > 2M . First, observe that ±(k)¸1=2 and that ±(k) = 1=2 if and only if k n = M and K ¡n M :
² If k n < M , then k i = k i for i = 1; :::; n and thusK = K > 2M , which, together with ¼(k)¸0, yields ±(k) > 1=2.
² If k n > M and K ¡n > M , then ¼(k) = 0 andK > 2M , and thus ±(k) = 1 ¡ M=K > 1=2.
² If k n > M and K ¡n M, then ¼(k) = M ¡ K ¡n and thus:
Second, note that the distributions in K ¤ (K; n) are those satisfying k n = K ¡n = M and that they yield ± ¤ (k) = 1=2. Hence, since ± ¤ (k)¸±(k)¸±(k), we have: K ¤ (K; n) ½ K(K; n); moreover, all distributions in K(K; n) must yield ±(k) = ±(k) = 1=2 and must thus satisfy k n > M and K ¡n M.
Assume now that a distribution satisfying k n > M and K ¡n < M belongs to K(K; n), and thus satis…es ±(k) = ±(k) (= 1=2). It must then be the case that condition (??) is binding for each …rm i, and thus that the minmax pro…ts can be sustained as equilibrium values. But this is not possible since k n > M > K ¡n implies ¼ i (k) = 0 for i < n and ¼ n (k) > 0: To implement ¼ i , …rm n should thus set its price equal to 0 in every period, but then it would obtain a payo¤ lower than its minmax. Hence K(k; n) = K ¤ (k; n). ii) Assume K < n n¡1
M . From (??):
Hence k S 2 K(K; n). The above inequality also implies that perfect collusion can be sustained for ± = 1=n only if …rms can be punished down to their minmax pro…ts, and if each minmax pro…t ¼ i = maxf0; M ¡ K ¡i g is moreover equal to M ¡ K ¡i , that is, if K ¡n ::: K ¡1 M , which impliesk i = k i ( M ) and K = K.
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Assume …rst that for ± = 1=n there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium that gives …rm 1 its minmax pro…t M ¡K ¡1 . In the …rst period of this equilibrium, the price p n charged by …rm n cannot exceed p ¤´( M ¡ K ¡1 ) =k 1 , since otherwise by (slightly) undercutting …rm n; …rm 1 would get a market sharek 1 (since K ¡n M ) and a pro…tk 1 p n > M ¡ K ¡1 (and it can always secure itself its minmax pro…t in all the following periods). But if …rm n charges a price p n p ¤ in this …rst period, its average discounted payo¤ will be at mostk n [(1 ¡ 1=n)p ¤ + 1=n]. But if k 1 < (1 ¡ 1=n)k n ,k 1 < (1 ¡ 1=n)k n (since k i M ) and:
which cannot be true in equilibrium. Therefore …rm 1 obtains necessarily more than its minmax in equilibrium, and ±(k) is therefore strictly larger than 1=n. A similar argument holds for mixed strategy equilibria. Except if n = 2, where k 1 < M < k 2 is also a possibility. However in that case, punishing …rm 1 down to its minmax would require …rm 2 to constantly set its price equal to 0 and thus to get a lower payo¤ than its minmax.
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Assume the price p n charged by …rm n exceeds p > (M ¡ K ¡1 ) =k 1 with probability 1. Then by slightly undercutting the price p, …rm 1 secures a payo¤ strictly larger than its minmax, a contradiction. Thus …rm n must choose a price below or equal to p with positive probability. The expected pro…t …rm n derives in equilibrium when choosing a price below p in the …rst period is bounded byk n [(1 ¡ 1=n)p + 1=n]. Since p may be chosen arbitrarily close to p ¤ , we obtain that …rm n would get an expected equilibrium pro…t below its minimax M ¡ K ¡n when k 1 is strictly smaller than (1 ¡ 1=n)k n :
